Ambassador of Australia

I should say at the outset that what I am presenting today is not a statement of government policy.  It is a reflection on history.  It highlights some strands in Australian policy as commented on by academics, strategic thinkers and through the words of Australian politicians.

It is always an interesting question how individual countries see their place in the world and how that shapes their strategic policy.  I am too new here to have a view of the Greek perception.  But I was struck by a line in George Seferis’s journal for 1942 where he wrote: ‘I felt my fate placed as that of the Greeks has always been, at the exact point where the balance tips between Greece and the East’.  I sense that that observation has validity for some Greek policies today.

But my question today is how does Australia see its place in the world; and how has that view led to Australia believing that a middle-sized power, such as we are, needs to make serious commitments to global security – militarily and diplomatically.

An underlying theme in what I have to say is the story of a great transformation in Australia’s circumstances.

Australia’s original view of the world was shaped by a sense of isolation, of remoteness from the centres of world power, and a degree of fear of Asia.  Over the course of the last century, we have lost that sense of remoteness and isolation.  Instead, we have found ourselves situated in a region that has become in recent decades the most strategically and economically significant part of the globe.

Through such a dramatic period of change in our regional circumstances, the great continuity in Australia’s strategic view has been the realisation that our country has a major stake in the global balance of power.

Our origin as a nation was as a tiny colony of Great Britain at what was then seen as the far end of the world along vulnerable sea routes.  That vulnerability meant that the Napoleonic wars posed a real threat to the future of what was to become Australia.  It is no exaggeration to say that for the colony, the distant battle of Trafalgar in 1805 was a decisive event, for by defeating the French and Spanish navies, Admiral Nelson laid the ground for British global naval supremacy for the next century and a half.  That supremacy created the secure conditions in which the Australian colonies could prosper and eventually attain independence.  (And of course when I think about it British naval power at the battle of Navarino in 1827 contributed to the achievement of Greek independence).

By the time Australia became independent in 1901, our population numbered under 4 million on a vast continent.  Australians still saw security as coming from from Great Britain.  So when the balance of power broke down in Europe in 1914, Australians instinctively knew they had a vital stake in the outcome: 61,500 Australians died in that European war – a staggering proportion of the young nation’s population.  Australia’s participation in that war and its subsequent active diplomacy at the Versailles conference, ensuring its independent membership in the League of Nations, set the standard for Australia’s engagement with the world ever since. 

Australia’s international military commitments in the 20^th century are well known, including in Greece where we fought together in the second world war.  (I have just returned from the commemorations for the 67^th anniversary of the Battle of Crete.)  We fought in Korea, Vietnam, the two Gulf wars.  Today we have more forces in Afghanistan than most NATO European countries.  We have a peacekeeping presence in Cyprus, Sinai, Lebanon, Sudan, Iraq, East Timor and the Solomon Islands.

You might ask why?  I believe the answer lies in a clear sense among Australian policy makers that the consequences of adverse outcomes in the world wars or the cold war would have been catastrophic for our national interests.  And so too would it be today if the international community lost its will and cohesion in addressing the challenge of terrorism.  In our immediate region, the South Pacific, we have worked with nations of the region to support good governance.  The consequences of failed or failing states in our neighbourhood would pose acute difficulties for Australia.

I hope from this quick sketch that you can understand that Australia has held consistently to a concept that ‘security is indivisible’:  it is a concept that means that you cannot pick and choose what parts of global security you want to be involved in, nor can you think that global security can be left to the ‘big players’ and that middle ranking countries can just play a regional role.  I have explained the origin of the approach in a sense of isolation.

But we can no longer think of Australia as isolated.  Australian policies are now heavily influenced by what is loosely termed the ‘rise of Asia’ on our doorstep and the related trend of globalization. 

This change in Australia’s circumstance has only increased the need for international policy engagement at all levels.  The changes also, particularly those wrought by globalization, have begun to erase the distinction between domestic and foreign policy.

I will quickly give you some background on the circumstances that drive Australia’s policies.  After the Second World War, Australia had three basic strategic policy options – these options were never mutually exclusive, but at times sat together uncomfortably.  What is now happening in response to a period of rapid strategic change is that the three options are converging as strands of one coherent policy.

The three strands or options have been:

1. an alliance with ‘great and powerful friends”:  Britain until it exhausted itself in the Second World War and since then the United States with whom we formed an alliance in 1951
2. engagement with Asia
3. active international citizenship. 

As I have already suggested, the first option, partnership with a powerful ally, represents continuity for Australia over time and regardless of political party in power.  Our new Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, has described the relationship with the United States as one of the three pillars of our foreign policy.  And this approach has been consistently supported by the Australian public.  For example, Australian opinion polls show that even when a majority of Australians opposed the policies of the current Bush administration, support for the alliance with the United States remained high.  The alliance has bipartisan support.  It has endured through and beyond the Cold War.

The reason that is so relates in part to the second option, engagement with Asia.  We live now at a time one of Australia’s leading strategic thinkers likes to call the end of the Vasco da Gama era: the end of the 500 year period when the west dominated Asia.  It has become a cliché to say that the 21^st century is the Asian century.  Europe, once the source of our security – and a threat to it when twice its balance of power broke down – is important but no longer central to world power.

That means we have to engage: to seek, as a former Prime Minister said, our security ‘in Asia, not from Asia’. But Asia is not like Europe.  There is no security architecture such as NATO provides, nor a political and economic group such as the European Union.  In his book, The Breaking of Nations, the EU diplomat, Robert Cooper contrasted the ‘post-modern’ international environment of Europe with the persistence of traditional nation state politics elsewhere.  The Asia-Pacific is the site of three of the most dangerous strategic flashpoints, the Taiwan straits, the Korean Peninsula, and Kashmir, as well as traditional rivalries between the great powers.

So Australia has become actively engaged in the development of regional mechanisms that can accommodate the different strategic and economic interests of diverse nations such as China, India and Japan.  We helped found the Asia-Pacific Economic Forum whose members account for approximately 41% of the world's population, approximately 55% of world GDP and about 49% of world trade.  We have bilateral security agreements with Japan and Indonesia.  We participate in the East Asia summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum.  We have a network of MOUs on counter terrorism with regional countries.  All such activity seeks to develop common perceptions about regional security and economic growth.  And in this task, our alliance with the United States is a strength.  As our Foreign Minister put it just last month: ‘The United States’ role has continued to provide the stability that allows nations in our region to focus on their pursuit of economic prosperity.  An ongoing presence in, and active engagement by the United States in the Asia Pacific, is essential into the future for both security and prosperity purposes’.

The United States is the world’s greatest provider of security.  That doesn’t mean we can’t disagree with it from time to time.  But it does mean that we too have obligations to provide as much security to the world as we can through our military and diplomatic means.  We do not want a ‘free ride’.

So that leaves me with the third strand, active international citizenship, to which Australia’s new government has given renewed commitment.  For Australia, any action that develops international political and trade norms and strengthens a rules-based system of world order is a benefit to our security.  The security we derive from our bilateral relationships and alliance can only be reinforced by a robust multilateral system.

We were active in the founding of the United Nations.  Today we are the 13^th largest contributor to its budget.  The UN has provided us with the framework for our many contributions to peacekeeping.  We seek to take a lead in the reform of the United Nations to better reflect the global balance of power.  We are working hard to ensure a successful conclusion to the Doha round: multilateral agreement to further trade liberalisation would have great benefits for world prosperity (and long-suffering consumers, particularly through lower food prices).

Australia’s past has shaped the way in which we embrace actively the concept of international good citizenship. 

So what is different now?

I think the answer lies in a new sense of urgency.  The world we once felt isolated from can no longer be kept at a distance.  The threats of terrorism, climate change and weapons proliferation don’t come from states.  They cross borders.  So our Prime Minister has emphasised that ‘foreign policy, foreign economic policy and national security policy must increasingly be seen as the natural expression and extension of the nation’s domestic policy interests’.  He says ‘those who believe in the splendid isolation of the Australian continent live in a fool’s paradise’.

This view gives a new imperative to global, regional and multilateral engagement.  For us, for example, the outcome in Afghanistan will affect our ability to act on terrorism domestically.  And I am very pleased to say at this point that the Australian and Canadian embassies together with Hellenic Aid will mount an exhibition in late June at the Syntagma Metro Station on our reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan.

The linkage between the domestic and the external is perhaps most dramatic for us in the economic sphere.  Because we do not belong to any natural regional grouping and depend heavily on international trade, Australia anticipated globalization early.  The policy response of successive Australian governments has been to recognise that resisting globalization can only harm the economy through the distortions of protection and excesive regulation.  Instead, we have prepared for the challenge through nearly three decades of economic reform, dismantling tariff barriers, deregulating the financial and labour markets.  We are a leading exponent of the benefits of global free trade.

In this we set a good example.  Those decades of domestic economic reform have left us in good shape to engage the world and to compete in our region.  We have the 16^th largest economy in the world and the fifth largest in Asia.  We rank at seven in the list of the world’s most competitive economies prepared by the Swiss Institute for Management Development.  Australia’s defence spending is the 11^th largest in the world.  We are a country of immigration with the dynamism and demographic benefits that entails.  It has its challenges, but we are fortunate to be situated in the fastest growing region of the world.

We have the confidence to see that the three policy options posed by our perspective on the world can combine, and make us a contributor at all levels to global security and prosperity.

In summary, Australia’s location in the world has made Australia appreciate that it has to work hard on policies that help guarantee global stability and prosperity.  we see the United States as remaining essential to the preservation of stability and security into the foreseeable future.  We see our future as being in Asia, and we are actively engaged in diplomacy that will lay the foundation for emerging security architecture in the region.  We believe that nations can only be economically secure if they accept that a strong economic reform agenda is vital to meet the challenge of globalisation.  And we believe in the necessity of giving as much as we can to strengthening the multilateral system as a guarantor of international rules to prevent yet another breakdown of international order such as the 20^th century experienced.

And I should say too that Australia is eager to work in all these endeavours with Europe.  We cooperate closely in multilateral fora on climate change, disarmament, non-proliferation and terrorism.  We have increased our cooperation with NATO in response to NATO’s broader approach to global security, exemplified in Afghanistan.  Australia is the ideal partner for the EU in the Asia-Pacific region.  And as I have underlined today, the developments in the Asia-Pacific will be a key determinant of all our futures.